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Abstract: The article outlines arguments for the relevance of people’s attitudes 
towards freedom of expression: It is a fundamental principle of democracy that if a 
virtue does not receive support from the population, it will not be anchored in law 
and its foundation is endangered in the medium term. People’s support for free 
speech is becoming even more influential because authoritative control of internet 
communication is faced with difficulties. Furthermore, with the development of 
social media users gain new opportunities to publicly express their opinions 
attaching even more importance to normative self-regulation. As a matter of fact, 
these increased opportunities of self-regulation may either enhance or decrease the 
exercise of expression rights. Thus, citizen’s endorsement of free expression is a 
valuable indicator of the status of freedom of expression in a country. To approach 
to the subject empirically, the paper systematizes findings on people’s attitudes 
towards free speech: Most people believe in freedom of expression in the abstract. 
Willingness to apply the right to opposing groups, however, is lower. Perceived 
threats, confidence in democratic principles, mode of communication, and 
personality variables influence tolerance of expressions. Finally, a research agenda 
is put forward to examine appreciation of free expression, its antecedence, and 
implications.  
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*** 
La relevance des attitudes des gens par rapport à la liberté de 
l’expression dans un environnement media changeant  
Résumé : L'article présente des arguments pour la pertinence de l'attitude des gens 
par rapport à la liberté d'expression. L’un des principes fondamentaux de la 
démocratie affirme que si une vertu ne reçoit pas le soutien de la population, elle ne 
sera pas ancrée dans la loi et son fondement risque de disparaître à moyen terme. Le 
soutien du peuple pour la liberté d'expression devient de plus en plus influent car le 
contrôle sur la communication sur Internet exercé par les autorités se heurte à des 
difficultés. En outre, face au développement des médias sociaux, les utilisateurs 
gagnent de nouvelles possibilités pour exprimer publiquement leurs opinions, 
accordant ainsi une importance encore plus grande à l'autorégulation normative. En 
effet, ces possibilités d'autoréglementation peuvent soit augmenter soit diminuer 
l'exercice des droits d'expression. Ainsi, l'approbation de la libre expression par les 
citoyens est un indicateur précieux de l'état par rapport à la liberté d'expression dans 
un pays. Pour aborder le sujet de façon empirique, l’article systématise les données 
sur les attitudes des gens vis-à-vis de la liberté d'expression. La plupart des gens 
croient en la liberté d'expression d’une façon abstraite. La volonté d'appliquer le 
droit à des groupes d'opposition, cependant, est plus faible. Les menaces perçues, la 
confiance dans les principes démocratiques, le mode de communication et les 
variables individuelles de la personnalité influencent la tolérance vis-à-vis de la 
liberté d’expression. Enfin, un programme de recherche est mis en avant pour 
examiner l'appréciation de la liberté d'expression, de ses antécédents et de ses 
implications.  
 





Freedom of expression is a core value in democratic societies. Its vitality is 
monitored by several organizations which provide data on the status of freedom of 
expression and the media in the world (e. g., Committee to Protect Journalists, 2012; 
Freedom House, 2011a; International Research and Exchanges Board, 2011; 
Reporters without Borders, 2011; cf. Becker, Vlad, & Nusser, 2007). The 
organizations focus on the institutional support of free opinion and its unimpeded 
exercise. They mirror the legal, political, and economic conditions for the 
development of independent media, lively journalism, and unrestricted expression. 
Recently, also the level of internet freedom has started to be monitored as the 
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internet has emerged as a crucial medium to mobilize and advocate reforms. For 
example, Freedom House (2011b) launched its Freedom on the Net ranking of 37 
countries. Such elite assessments give highly relevant insight into the quality of 
freedom of expression as institutional support or harassment directly restrict 
professionals’ and individuals’ exercise of the right. A focus on institutional 
coverage, however, lacks information on the importance of freedom of expression 
with those who are supposed to exercise the right. The present article therefore 
argues in favor of an additional indicator for the status of freedom of expression. It 
outlines two arguments for measuring the relevance that people attribute to freedom 
of expression: It presents a general argument based on democracy theory as well as 
an argument deduced from the new opportunities for communication in times of 
internet and user generated content in the Web 2.0. Taking into account the 
relevance of people’s commitment to the value immediately draws interest to its 
empirical examination. The paper systematizes existing findings on people’s 
attitudes towards freedom of expression and proposes a research agenda for future 
studies on the status of freedom of expression.  
 
Before turning to the core arguments of the paper, some specifications appear 
necessary: Freedom of expression comprises the right to offer one’s thoughts via any 
channel without constraints. Freedom of speech, of the press, of the media, etc. are 
subsets of freedom of expression that relate to specific ways of communication. 
Press and media freedom not only include the protection of the individual’s 
expressions via the media, but also an institutional guarantee of a free media system 
(Breunig, 1994, pp. 50ff). As the core arguments of the article will apply to all 
means of expression no matter if they are mediated or direct or if they stem from 
institutions and professionals like media organizations and journalists or from 
laymen, the broad term ‘freedom of expression’ will be used.  
 
The second specification concerns the balance of freedom and its limitations 
(Breunig, 1994, pp. 111ff): On the one hand, freedom of expression includes 
protection from censorship and support for communicators (e.g., the protection of 
journalists’ sources or journalists’ right to access information from public 
authorities). On the other hand, even in democratic states, free speech is not without 
limitations. These constraints do not necessarily reflect illiberal restrictions of civil 
rights, but are the result of weighing colliding fundamental rights (cf. Peffley, 
Knigge, & Hurwitz, 2001a). For example, in many constitutions discriminatory and 
racist speech is not protected by freedom of expression. The higher competing goods 
like equality are valued, the less protection is granted for free expression. Given 
these two sides of the coin, the appreciation of freedom of expression should not 
only be considered regarding the citizens’ appreciation of free expression as a 
fundamental right in general. An estimation of the attitude towards the value is also 
derived from people’s support for censorship when colliding values are concerned. 
This will provide a more substantive picture of the status of expression rights from 
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the people’s point of view and allow for a more comprehensive cross-national 
comparison. 
 
2. Relevance of people’s attitude towards freedom of expression 
 
Whereas institutional protection and harassment of free expression have caught 
some attention in the evaluation of the status of freedom of expression around the 
world, measuring appreciation of the value by laymen has received less interest. The 
following two sections will explain two arguments for its relevance.  
 
2.1. Civic commitment and institutionalization of values 
Inglehart (1997) concludes on democracy in general: “In the long run, 
democracy is not attained simply by making institutional changes or through clever 
elite-level maneuvering. Its survival also depends on what ordinary people think and 
feel” (p. 215; see also, e. g., Bollinger, 1986; Bahry, Boaz, & Gordon, 1997). His 
statement may hold true specifically for the democratic right of free expression: Free 
speech requires institutionalized endorsement and support by the government and 
state institutions. This, however, is not sufficient. The people’s valuation is just as 
important. If a virtue does not receive support from the population, it will not be 
anchored in law, and its foundation is endangered in the medium term. This 
fundamental principle of democracy is most comprehensible in direct democracy 
where people vote on policy initiatives directly. In representative democracy, people 
voice their interests in elections of representatives, who are accountable to the 
people. The citizens’ attitudes towards free speech will therefore have influence on 
political and legal support as well as on limitations of the value. The massive 
demonstrations against the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) in Spring 
2012 can serve as a recent example: Many European states that have signed the 
treaty have set aside the ratification in response to the public protests that criticize 
the secrecy of the negotiations and potential threats to freedom of expression and 
other civil liberties.  
 
This leaves the question concerning the relevance of people’s attitude towards 
expression rights in non-democratic countries. Expressing one’s opposition to the 
status quo is particularly difficult when civil liberties are restricted. Especially 
limitations of free opinion, dependency of media, and limited access to information 
profoundly constrain people’s influence on policy. However, civic will might dig its 
way to change by turmoil. The Arab Spring exemplifies institutional changes 
triggered and followed through by civil pressure. Among other objectives, the 
protesters successfully rallied for more freedom of expression. Therefore, one can 
agree to the careful conclusion by Becker, English, and Vlad (2010), who rank the 
relevance of citizens’ attitudes alongside institutional guarantee of free media: “A 
country like Vietnam, for example, which gets low scores [in terms of freedom of 
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the media] from evaluators but not from the general public, might rightly be 
considered to have a more free media system than a country, such as Russia, that 
scores poorly on both” (p. 20).  
 
Concluding from the first argument, the attitude of laymen towards the 
importance of free expression is relevant when these laymen are considered in their 
role as citizens. The citizens’ attitudes towards fundamental human rights may exert 
influence on institutional treatment of these issues and therefore is a factor not to be 
neglected when investigating the status of free expression. However, up to this 
point, empirical testing of the assumption that citizens’ attitudes towards democratic 
principles actually have an impact is limited. Elitist theory of democracy even 
argues that people involved in the political arena may counterweight the public 
values. In Western societies, political elites are assumed to be in stronger consent 
with democratic principles than the mass. This is supposed to work in favor of free 
expression when appreciation of laymen is low (Bahry et al., 1997; Gibson & 
Bingham, 1983; Sullivan, Walsh, Shamir, Barnum, & Gibson, 1993). Consequently, 
this also implies the suggestion that elites have the opportunities to hinder 
liberalization when authorities oppose expression rights as a means of preserving 
power. However, first results indicate the validity of the assumed relationship: Naab, 
Hefner, Scherer, Schmid, and Hansen (2010) conducted a cross-national secondary 
analysis on the institutionalization of free expression and its appreciation in the 
population. They uncover a positive and significant correlation between the 
Freedom House Index ‘Freedom of Expression and Belief” and country-level data of 
the World Value Survey on the importance attributed to freedom of expression by 
laymen. It is important to be careful in asserting the direction of causality. The 
citizens’ attitude may influence institutional processes in free countries. At the same 
time, in the process of socialization, individuals may learn which behavior patterns 
and attitudes are acceptable and which are not. This process is also affected by the 
predominant culture of a society and its explicit and institutional protection of free 
speech.  
 
2.2. Normative self-regulation of social media communication 
Beyond the assumed interdependence of civic appreciation and 
institutionalization of a value, there is a second argument on the relevance of 
people’s attitudes which derives from the changing media environment and its 
limited legal control.  
 
States provide legal rules for expressions, most of them impose legal restrictions 
of freedom of expression, and some also guarantee legal support for free expression 
by safeguarding an appropriate environment and support for communicators. The 
law is agreed as binding, its regulation is compulsory. Provided that a state follows 
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the principles of rule of law, violations are punished by state authority. In addition to 
the law, values and norms serve as an internal control of each individual. Although 
standards of ethics are not necessarily shared by everybody and a breach of ethics 
cannot be punished directly, ethics form the second important pillar of control 
besides law: Values and norms give prospective orientation. When norms are in 
accordance to law, normative orientations will help to prevent violations of rights a 
priori. They are means of regulating behavior in areas where it has not (yet) been 
possible to provide definite legal clarification. When norms oppose authoritative 
guidelines, normative self-regulation may lead to an evasion of law and to making 
use of legal vacuums (cf. Debatin, 1997; Horstler, 1997).  
 
Norm guided use of the media is becoming even more important as legal 
coverage of basic human rights is facing severe difficulties in internet 
communication. Several aspects contribute to an enhanced influence of normative 
beliefs (cf. Funiok, 2000; Karmasin, 1999, p. 371; Tambini, Leonardi, & Marsden, 
2008): There is a time-lag between new media development and jurisdiction 
concerning new technological, social, and economic aspects. Furthermore, media 
and especially online media have a transnational character. Although there are 
European and international approaches of approximation of legislation and law 
enforcement across international borders, comprehensive legal control of 
transnationally disseminated media is impossible. Communicative channels 
multiplied, structures decentralized, and authoritative influences to impose access 
restrictions against communicators decreased. Besides that, internet content is 
persistent, i. e., once published it cannot be deleted but may have spread, be linked 
to, and be saved in internet archives (e. g., Google Cache and archive.org). This 
limits chances of retrospective authoritative regulation.  
 
Apart from the aforementioned difficulties concerning most internet content, 
further matters complicate legal regulation of social media and open up 
opportunities for normative self-regulation. In 2004, the term Web 2.0 was coined. It 
subsumes flexible and user-friendly technologies and applications that facilitate 
interoperability and participatory content production (Stanoevska-Slabeva, 2008, 
pp. 15f). Recently, several authors refer to the term ‘social media’ instead of Web 
2.0. It is difficult to differentiate categories of social media or Web 2.0 as there are 
many hybrid applications. However, Schmidt (2009, pp. 22ff; see also Lietsala & 
Sirkkunen, 2008) provides a helpful overview on relevant social media applications: 
multimedia platforms, weblogs, micro blogs, podcasts and video casts, wikis, instant 
messaging, feed readers and social news services, and social networks (the later 
integrating many of the aforementioned services). Most Web 2.0 platform operators 
do not produce content and do not provide editorial services, but they provide the 
users with means of production. Users need little technical skills and equipment to 
publish text and audio-visual material on these platforms, referred to as user 
generated content. With the rise of social media, laymen gained new opportunities to 
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communicate publicly. This rekindles hopes on democratizing effects of internet 
communication because of the decentralized structure and low access barriers to 
publish and to receive information free of state, hegemonic or editorial control. 
Some social media communication takes place in small groups, private chats, and on 
barely known platforms. Limited access to these small groups hampers control by 
law. Prosecution of infringements is complicated by the increased anonymity of 
many communicators. The actual producer of information or opinion is quite often 
only known by a nickname. The operators of Web 2.0 platforms are mostly host 
providers, i. e., they publish content produced by others on their web servers. 
Depending on the state legislation of a country, the host providers are only liable to 
a limited extent for the content published by their users. 
 
Because of the increased potential for free expression, the question is raised how 
to use these opportunities responsibly. Normative orientations have an increasing 
impact on freedom of expression, its enforcement, and the compliance with its 
limitations. It is therefore necessary to regard not only institutional open spaces but 
also normative attitudes of those who will or will not make use of the freedom. As a 
matter of fact, the increased opportunities of normative self-regulation may either 
enhance or decrease the exercise of expression rights. When actors hold liberal 
attitudes and feel safe to apply them, they can make use of limited editorial and state 
control. The mentioned characteristics give way to suppressed opinions and enable 
opposition to authoritative standpoints with less fear of harassment. Additionally, 
less external control also facilitates extreme expressions beyond socially tolerable 
limits like cyber mobbing or hate speech. Thus, ethical limitations and the protection 
of colliding values are in the hands of the new communicators as well.  
 
Yet, one should not resort to a technological deterministic perspective assuming 
per se that the new chances for deliberation are made use of (for a summary of the 
discussion of the democratizing effects and counter-arguments see, e.g., Calingaert, 
2010; van de Donk, Loader, Nixon, & Rucht, 2004; Gerhards & Schäfer, 2007, 
2010; Groshek, 2009; Koopmans & Zimmermann, 2003). Furthermore, self-control 
beyond law may constrain freedom, when communicators practice self-censorship 
because they fear personal safety, experience economic pressure or lack knowledge 
on legal protection. Although legal control of online expressions is limited (not fully 
disabled), individuals still need to summon the courage to resist social mechanisms 
of control and even denunciation. It is confirmed that perceived threats, e. g. of 
authoritative retribution or social isolation, as well as personality differences 
influence the willingness to express one’s opinion (Hayes, Glynn, & Shanahan, 
2005; Hyde & Ruth, 2002; Wyatt, Katz, Levinsohn, & Al-Haj, 1996). Following the 
BBC World Service Poll of 2010, 52 % of the respondents of 26 countries do not 
feel safe to express their opinions on the internet. Yet, there is a hard core of people 
who bear the risk of rejection and still express their opinions (Glynn & McLeod, 
1984; Liu & Fahmy, 2011; Noelle-Neumann, 1984). 
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3. Measuring public opinion on freedom of expression 
The outlined arguments suggest to empirically examine people’s attitudes 
towards free speech. Since Stouffer’s work “Communism, Conformity, and Civil 
Liberties” (1955), researchers of political science have devoted considerable effort 
to examine political tolerance, its antecedence, and consequences for democracy 
building. One of the main indicators of political tolerance used in these studies is 
tolerance of free expression. The issue has, however, rarely been regarded as an 
indicator of the status of freedom of expression beyond institutionalized support. 
Only in some recent polls, respondents were asked to evaluate the degree of freedom 
of their country’s media system. The validity of these assessments is examined in 
several secondary analyses and the authors find medium-size to high correlations 
between elite assessments and people’s evaluation of media freedom (BBC World 
Service, 2007; Becker & Vlad, 2009, 2010; Becker, English, & Vlad, 2010; Becker, 
Vlad, & English, 2010; English, 2007; English & Becker, 2012; Kull et al., 2008). 
Yet, the measures do not focus on the citizens’ attitude but on their evaluation of the 
institutional circumstances. The present article will directly address people’s 
individual attitudes which are a prerequisite to use expression rights and to tolerate 
expressions of others even if they are prohibited by law. The article at hand does not 
provide new empirical results but integrates existing data. The next paragraph gives 
an overview of findings on the importance citizens attribute to freedom of 
expression. Afterwards, results are presented on the estimated importance of free 
expression on the internet and in social media.  
 
3.1. Laymen’s commitment to freedom of expression 
It is a consistent finding of most studies on the commitment to freedom of 
expression that on the one hand most people favor freedom of expression in the 
abstract. On the other hand, however, their willingness to apply this right in specific 
situations and to opposing communicators is lower. Considering this striking 
inconsistency between support for abstract norms and less support for applying these 
norms to offensive groups Peffley, Knigge, and Hurwitz (2001a; cf. Miller, Wynn, 
Ullrich, & Marti, 2001; Peffley, Knigge, & Hurwitz, 2001b) emphasize that 
decisions to support restrictions of concrete expressions are made against the 
background of a competition of values. When people are (made) aware of the fact 
that the right to free expression could collide with other rights like social stability or 
privacy, support diminishes considerably. For example, a person favoring free 
speech but at the same time appreciating racial equality would be in conflict about 
either tolerating or restricting publications of members of the Ku Klux Klan. 
Consequently, Peffley and colleagues (2001a, 2001b) propose measuring perceived 
conflicts between free speech and other values to tap the importance of freedom of 
expression.  
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The World Value Survey 2008 used such forced-choice measurement (World 
Value Survey, 2012; see also Naab et al., 2010). Respondents in 56 countries were 
asked to choose the most important value out of a list of four statements. The list 
contains two materialistic values (“maintaining order in the nation”, “fighting rising 
prices”) and two non-materialistic values (“giving people more say in important 
government decisions”, “protecting freedom of speech”; Abramson & Inglehart, 
1995; Inglehart, 1977). South Koreans rate freedom of expression least valuable: 
2 % of the respondents choose freedom of expression to be the most important 
value. The largest percentage is reached in the Netherlands (41 %). As a 
comparison: 18 % of the US-American participants and 21 % of the French 
participants choose free expression (for similar forced-choice measurement, see 
BBC World Service, 2007). The main body of research on laymen’s appreciation of 
free expressions implicitly refers to such value conflicts. The scholars specify a 
target group of communicators or some content of expressions. Study participants 
are then asked about their willingness to tolerate expressions of this target group. 
The measure indirectly forces them to choose between granting freedom of 
expression to the group and the value that the group opposes. The substantial 
question therefore is where laymen draw the line between tolerable and intolerable 
expressions. However, the answer is manifold. Davis (1990) summarizes the 
findings of his cross-national study, which may hold true for most comparative 
studies on the commitment to freedom of expression: A core group of citizens are 
generally supportive of free speech and another group of people generally favor 
censorship. The remaining citizens tend to disagree on the question which 
limitations of free speech are tolerable and which amount to inadequate censorship. 
“So far, what we have seen looks like an international unpopularity contest where 
judges disagree” (p. 8). Accordingly, empirical results on people’s tolerance of 
expressions and international rankings of more or less supportive countries strongly 
depend on the target dimension used in the studies.  
 
However, some factors of influence on tolerance of expressions prove consistent 
in many studies. The more a group of communicators is perceived as threatening, 
the more strongly people demand limitations of the target group members’ 
opportunities to express themselves (Bahry et al., 1997; Gibson, 2006; Hurwitz & 
Mondak, 2002). People more strongly tend to support a restriction of expressions 
they perceive to be socially harmful and undesirable (McLeod, Detenber, & 
Eveland, 2001; Paek, Lambe, & McLeod, 2008). This complicates cross-national 
comparisons of the status of expression freedom. “Aside from the obvious 
difficulties that arise when such group is non-existent in some nations, these 
measures inhibit comparison because the same group may not be equally threatening 
in two contexts” (Hurwitz & Mondak, 2002, p. 117). A solution to this vulnerability 
of target-specific measures is to apply a ‘least-liked’ approach. The respondent 
identifies her/his own target group by naming the most disliked group. Though this 
measure has become the dominant strategy in tolerance research, it is still necessary 
54    Teresa K. NAAB People’s Attitudes Towards Freedom of Expression 
to control the perceived threat of the group to draw conclusions on the liberality of 
the respondents, because “Quite simply, a ‘least-liked’ group is not necessarily 
equally disliked in all contexts” (Hurwitz & Mondak, 2002, p. 117).  
 
Another factor that determines tolerant free speech judgments is commitment to 
democratic principles in general. Those who believe in democratic norms are more 
willing to apply freedom of expression even when faced with disliked and extremist 
groups (Davis, 1990; Lambe, 2004; Marcus et al., 1995; Paek et al., 2008; Sullivan, 
Piereson, & Marcus, 1982). This may be interpreted as a default level of 
commitment to democratic principles which influences decision-making in concrete 
situations (Lambe, 2004, p. 291; Marcus et al., 1995, p. 59). However, the results of 
Bahry, Boaz, and Gordon (1997) suggest that though so-called demophiles, i.e., 
people with high commitment to democratic values, are more tolerant on average, 
demophiles in less established democracies are less tolerant towards extremes of the 
political spectrum because of fear of endangering democracy. The support of 
freedom of expression is decreased by low confidence in the efficiency of 
democratic institutions, of majority rules, and of institutionalized protection of 
minority rights (Gibson, 2006). In view of this result, it must be suggested that it 
will be an even bigger challenge to appreciate and exercise freedom of expression 
both for nations in democratic transition and non-democratic nations. From a 
normative point of view, limited implementation of democratic principles surely 
cannot justify constraints of freedom of expression. It can serve as an explanation, 
though. In this sense, Bahry and colleagues (1997) conclude: “At least for 
demophiles, denying rights to threatening groups is a realistic response to the 
fragility of democratic institutions. If so, their democratic intolerance may be less a 
reflection of an ingrained authoritarian culture than a rational answer to political 
chaos” (p. 505).  
 
Several individual-level studies additionally examine sociodemographic and 
personality antecedents of willingness to censor expressions, among them age, 
gender, authoritarianism, conservatism, and religiosity (e. g., Bahry et al., 1997; 
Hurwitz & Mondak, 2002; Lambe, 2002, 2004; Marcus et al., 1995; Rojas, Shah, & 
Faber, 1996; for country-level analysis see Naab et al., 2010). The studies tend to 
yield mixed results. Influences vary with regard to the considered content of 
expression, the communicating group, the form or medium of expression (see 
below), and to measurement. Analyses which include all factors are not known, 
therefore knowledge on interaction effects and mediated influences is pending. 
However, the influence of psychological security is well confirmed. Those who are 
more insecure are less likely to tolerate expressions. Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 
(1982) even find proof that the effect of insecurity is direct and not mediated 
through threat perception. Furthermore, persons are more tolerant who have greater 
faith in others, who are less neurotic, and more open-minded (Bahry et al., 1997; 
Lambe, 2004; Marcus, Sullivan, Theiss-Morse, & Wood, 1995). Additionally, the 
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educational level contributes to political tolerance in general and to freedom of 
expression (for an overview see, e. g., Weil, 1985; Lambe, 2002). The common 
explanations for this influence refer to socialization with values of enlightenment 
and to highly educated people feeling more secure and hence being better able to 
tolerate diversity. However, Weil (1982, 1985) finds evidence that the relationship 
between education and free expression is not universal, but influenced by the 
dominant values of a regime or a society. Results confirming influences of education 
policy, classroom interventions, and participation in school media programs on 
attitudes towards free speech encourage the assumed socialization effect (Lopez, 
Levine, Dautrich, & Yalof, 2009). This means that a public and institutional pro-
liberty atmosphere will enhance individual appreciation among the well-educated, 
whereas a climate against free expression will reduce support among the well-
educated.  
In sum, it can be stated that although there are varying results of studies 
investigating and comparing the citizens’ attitudes towards boundaries of free 
expression rights, some significant factors have emerged. The status of freedom of 
expression is related to perceived threat, democratic commitment and trust as well as 
to some personal characteristics. When comparing the status of free expression, 
these factors should be considered to get a comprehensive picture and unbiased 
country-level comparison.  
 
3.2. Laymen’s attitudes towards free expressions on the internet and in social media 
As explained in the preceding paragraph, people’s attitudes towards free 
expressions vary considerably according to the perceived characteristics of the 
expression. It is now worth considering if the mode of expressing an opinion also 
influences tolerance of this opinion. If so, knowledge on the appreciation of free 
expression in classic media and non-mediated speech cannot simply be transferred 
to free internet communication. Hurwitz and Mondak (2002) present a valuable 
differentiation structuring this phenomenon. The authors find prove that intolerance 
of expressions stems from two different sources: (a) intolerance against expressions 
of a certain content, which the authors call discriminatory intolerance (see preceding 
paragraph), and (b) generic intolerance, caused by unwillingness to permit a certain 
expressive act regardless of the content. In this sense, Lambe (2002) develops a 
willingness to censor scale asking respondents to judge several expression speech 
situations. These situations vary regarding the expressed content (e. g., hate speech, 
political speech, defamatory speech) and regarding the medium (“pure” speech, 
demonstrations, newspaper, magazine, television, cable, internet) (see also Davis, 
1990; Lawrence, 1976; Sullivan et al., 1982).  
 
Only little data is available on tolerance of different modes of expression: Taking 
a closer look at generic intolerance, Davis (1990) shows that Australians, Austrians, 
Britons, Italians, Americans, and Germans differ in tolerance towards several forms 
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of non-mediated expressions like publishing books, holding meetings, and 
organizing demonstrations. The most comprehensive, cross-national data concerning 
certain expression situations is published by the International Social Survey 
Programme (2012). In 2006, respondents from 33 nations were asked if people 
should be allowed to organize public meetings, to organize protest marches and 
demonstrations, and to organize a nationwide strike to protest against the 
government. Thus, the poll focused on generic tolerance of diverse acts of 
expression while keeping the content nearly stable. On average, 46 % of the 
respondents would tolerate public meetings, whereas only 24 % would tolerate 
strikes.  
 
The lack of research is even more obvious with regard to people’s tolerance of 
free online expression. Some cross-national polls include questions on the support 
for internet censorship (without comparing it to other modes of expression). 
Following the BBC World Service (2010), for example, an average of 53 % of the 
respondents in 26 countries worldwide agrees that the internet should never be 
regulated by any level of government anywhere. The Portuguese agree the least 
(40 %), Nigerians the most (77 %). In the Worldpublicopinion.org Poll of 2008, 
participants of 23 nations were asked if the government should have the right to 
prevent people from having access to some things on the internet. On average, 62 % 
agree (Kull et al., 2008). Similarly, national studies add some empirical findings 
lacking, however, opportunities of cross-national comparison and comparison to 
other expressive acts. The attitudes towards internet freedom resemble those towards 
freedom of expression in general: People regard free online expression as important, 
but impose several restrictions. Tolerance is lowest for child pornography, political 
extremism, and violent content. Erotic content and content that infringes property 
rights and copyrights are considered to be less problematic. Kids and adolescents 
especially disapprove of websites featuring drug misuse, eating disorders, violence 
or suicide (Dehm & Storll, 2010; Infratest dimap, 2009; Livingstone, Haddon, 
Görzig, & Ólafsson, 2011; Machill, Neuberger, Schweiger, & Wirth, 2003; 
Schwenk, 2002). 
 
The study by Trepte, Reinecke, and Behr (2008) is the only one known to the 
author that explicitly focuses on social media, namely weblogs. The German 
participants attach specific importance to the standards that weblogs respect 
individual privacy rights and do not discriminate or insult on the grounds of gender, 
disability or minority background. However, they are more tolerant towards weblog 
content denigrating religious, ideological or moral convictions and weblogs 
presenting wrong information. From the opposite perspective, the data suggest that 
media users might be more willing to censor the former kind of content whereas 
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they might tend to demand the right of free expression for the latter.1 Interestingly, 
the authors find prove, that protecting rights colliding with the right of free 
expression is regarded as less relevant in weblogs compared to daily newspapers. 
However, the absolute values still show high support for the restriction of free 
speech in weblogs on grounds of ethical standards (cf. Cenite, Detenber, Koh, Lim, 
& Soon, 2009).  
Determinants of willingness to censor online expressions have not been 
investigated yet. Hurwitz and Mondak (2002) come to the conclusion “that the 
antecedents of generic intolerance remain poorly understood” (p. 116). Nevertheless, 
there are suggestions on the influence of personal media use on willingness to 
censor. The results of Trepte and colleagues (2008) indicate a stronger wish for 
restrictions in weblogs among respondents who use Web 2.0 services like weblogs, 
chats, and internet forums and who generate content compared to respondents who 
rarely use Web 2.0 applications. In contrast, studies on classic media suggest more 
tolerant attitudes towards a given form of media content when it is used by the 
evaluating persons themselves (McLeod et al., 2001; Paek et al., 2008). On the one 
hand, this contradiction may reflect methodological differences between the studies. 
On the other hand, the Web 2.0 offers an almost endless variety of content and it is 
difficult to select high-quality content. This might encourage claims for stricter 
standards of expressions. This interpretation will only apply to Web 2.0 users in 
countries enjoying access to a great variety of information and opinions. Probably, 
inhabitants of less free countries might favor increased variety over protection of 
conflicting rights.  
 
So far, the article has summarized the scarce findings on tolerance of online 
expressions by the readers of social media content. The willingness to censor and 
self-censor of those actively producing social media content as well as its 
determinants like perceived authoritative and social control have not received 
investigation yet. This is surprising as producers of media content have multiplied 
and come from various backgrounds. Many of the social media communicators are 
laymen with no journalistic training and they publish without direct editorial or 
authoritative support or control. Procedural and normative rules of Web 2.0 
publication develop in cloudy connection to existing ethic and legal standards 
(Cenite et al., 2009; Lenhart & Fox, 2006; Neuberger, 2005; Viégas, 2005). This 
draws attention to the mindset of the new communicators on the Web 2.0. Of course, 
proposed codes of blogging ethics, netiquette manuals, and other ethical guidelines 
for user generated content on social media platforms give an indication of ethic 
attitudes of the new communicators (e. g., Blood, 2002; O'Reilly, 2007; cf. Schulz & 
Held, 2008; Tambini et al., 2008). Most lay content producers, however, are not 
                              
1
 Please note that Trepte and colleagues aimed at examining ethical standards imposed by 
their participants as a criterion of media quality. The items did not directly tap on 
willingness to censor content considered of low quality. 
58    Teresa K. NAAB People’s Attitudes Towards Freedom of Expression 
familiar with those codes which receive only limited acceptance in the community. 
Therefore, these codes rather show general statements of ethics and quality 
standards than public opinion on norms for online expressions.  
 
In sum, the attitudes of laymen – and in times of the Web 2.0 of potential media 
content producers – towards freedom of expression and its limitations on the Web 
2.0 have aroused little scientific interest. The overview indicated that a closer 
examination of attitudes towards various expression acts may be fruitful. 
 
4. Conclusion 
The article argued that laymen’s endorsement of freedom of expression and their 
tolerance of opposing expressions indicate the status of freedom of expression. This 
suggestion is the foundation of democracy. Judge Learned Hand put it in his often 
quoted statement: “Liberty lies in the hearts of men and women. When it dies there, 
no constitution, no law, no court can save it” (Hand, 1944). It appears strikingly 
relevant to monitor the perceived importance of freedom of expression for the 
citizens. The present article summarized some methodological issues concerning 
such investigation. It was shown that appreciation of the expression rights in the 
abstract only gives an incomplete picture as people’s endorsement diminishes when 
the value collides with competing values. Consequently, results are determined by 
the conflict of values included in the measurement. This problem becomes most 
significant considering cross-national comparisons of free expression attitudes. 
International studies on the sentiment towards expression rights need multilayered 
measures including divers competing values and target groups equally portraying the 
situation of different cultural and national backgrounds. As providing fully unbiased 
measurement is rarely possible, studies need to control for the effects of perceived 
threat by a target group or an expression situation. Additionally, analyses on the 
appreciation of freedom of expression need to consider explanatory variables. 
Otherwise, the mere descriptive ranking of more or less tolerant countries (or 
individuals) leads to an incomprehensive picture that fosters polarizing 
interpretations. Important explanatory variables may include trust in democratic 
institutions able to absorb even extremist expressions and to secure colliding rights 
to an appropriate extent as well as the socio-economic and educational structure of 
the population.  
 
The reason for insisting on endorsement of free expression to be a foundation of 
democracy is the implicit assumption that liberal minded people(s) will exercise 
freedom of communication and apply the right to others. This assumption of free 
attitudes actually having behavioral implications needs to be proven. Such prove is 
required especially under the conditions of a changing media environment. 
Authoritative control of internet and social media content is limited compared to 
classic media of less multifacetedness and centralized structure. This presents 
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laymen with new opportunities to access and express opinions hitherto suppressed. 
This in turn begs the question if laymen actually are aware of these opportunities 
and if they take advantage of them. Endorsement of the value is only one element in 
the complex picture of the exercise of civil liberties. It is reasonable to suggest that 
perceived social and authoritative control and fear of its consequences have an 
impact on the willingness to censor, to self-censor, and on the actual behavior.  
 
Finally, the question arises if the citizens’ appreciation of a value is connected to 
its institutional protection. Democracy theory assumes so and hopes about the 
democratizing effect of the internet and social media rest on this suggested 
connection. The article cited some cautious indication of such a relationship (Naab 
et al., 2010) but the fundamental implications of the assumed relation demand 
additional research efforts. If liberal attitudes are intertwined with legal and political 
support, modifying the mindset and maintaining endorsement of civil liberties 
becomes central to comprehensive democratization. Persuasive campaigns and 
educational programs become highly relevant to democratic transitions. 
Institutionalization and appreciation of freedom of expression will then back each 
other. In countries lacking institutional protection of freedom of expression, there is 
no such mutual support. Citizens’ attitudes are essential for liberal reform and the 
Arab Spring suggests that, in the long run, they can have impact on the 
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